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An Alternative Vision of Politics and Violence:
Introducing Mimetic Theory in International Studies
Nature creates similarities. One need only think of 
mimicry.  The highest capacity for producing similarities, 
however, is man’s.  His gift of seeing resemblances is 
nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion 
in former times to become and behave like something 
else. Perhaps there is none of his higher functions in 
which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role.
Benjamin ([1933] 1991: 210)
Introduction
In the first of a long series of well-known university lectures, Heidegger (1968: 7) 
states: “that which really gives us food for thought did not turn way from man at 
some time or other which can be fixed in history – no, what really must be thought 
keeps itself turned away from man since the beginning.” One might suppose that 
René Girard has closely interpreted this Heiddegerian suggestion. For his work goes 
backwards in the attempt, revolutionary and radical, to search for precisely those 
things hidden since the foundation of the world.1 The origin of this new Archimedean 
point is traced back, as the reader will see, to a human dimension that has long been 
familiar but forgotten, close and seemingly distant, so near as to be hidden: imitation. 
“There is nothing” – Girard (1987: 7) affirms – “in human behaviour that is not 
learned, and all learning is based on imitation. If human beings suddenly ceased 
imitating, all forms of culture would vanish.” This seemingly simple statement, as we 
shall see, will find in Girard’s thought a new theoretical and revolutionary statute.
During a decades-long career,2 Girard has developed this initial intuition to 
build a general theory on the role of culture, religion and violence among the most 
original and radical of the last century. His work has been studied and fruitfully 
applied in the most diverse disciplines3 and is not a coincidence that the philosopher 
Gianni Vattimo has recently declared: ‘Reading René Girard’s work was as decisive 
1 This is not by chance the title of Girard’s magnum opus (1987).
2 For a detailed account of René Girard’s life and work, see Palaver (2013: 1-14).
3 For an overview of Girardian Studies, see the website of the Colloquium on Violence and Religion: 
http://www.uibk.ac.at/theol/cover/     
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to me as it was to read some of the works of Heidegger […] not just in intellectual 
terms but existential and personal ones too’ (Antonello, 2010: 27). 
The aim of this introduction is twofold: to explore the fundamental concepts that 
form the basis of Girard’s mimetic theory and to explain its analytic potential for 
international studies. To do this, the first part of the introduction will locate the work 
of Girard within the corpus of Western philosophical tradition by understanding, first, 
its epistemological originality and, accordingly, the hermeneutic insights that it offers 
to the humanities and social sciences. Girard, in fact, is a thinker who should be read 
by difference rather than similarity or analogy. Although he remains very close to 
many of the concepts and ideas of the Western tradition, Girard distances himself 
from them in a ‘subtle’ way and, for this reason, the originality of his work is 
sometimes not fully understood. In reconstructing Girard’s thought, it seems 
appropriate to follow the path that he himself, in a recent interview (Williams, 2003: 
262), suggested to be the evolution of his work and experience, characterized by 
“three great moments”: first, the discovery of the relationship between mimetic desire 
and rivalry; second, the scapegoat mechanism; finally, the uniqueness of the Bible 
from the standpoint of the scapegoat theory. 
The Epistemological Foundations: Imitation, Desire and Autonomy
Girard’s work is based on a fundamental and “single intuition”: the problematic 
relation that exists between mimetic behaviour and conflict (Girard, 1994: 190). This 
perspective has been underestimated in the social sciences and humanities because 
imitation, for a very long time, has been considered “a low-level, cognitively 
undemanding, even childish form of behaviour” (Hurley and Chater, 2005: 1). 
However, in the last two decades, a growing body of work has stressed the 
importance of imitation in processes of human development, social identification and 
cultural transmission. The discovery of mirror neurons, the recent advances in brain 
imaging and findings in social psychology all testify to the centrality of imitation in the 
human and social condition (Gallese et al., 1996; Meltzoff, 2007). As Hurley and 
Chater (2005: 1) have pointed out “imitation is not just an important factor in human 
development, it also has a pervasive influence throughout adulthood in ways we are 
just starting to understand”.
To understand, then, why this fundamental human dimension has been for a 
very long time downplayed within the human and social sciences, it is necessary to 
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penetrate the originary reason behind this neglect, investigating what has been 
called the paradigm of reflection or Representationalism (Sandwell, 1995: 42-51). 
For, behind the oblivion of the mimetic faculty lies a worldview that has opposed, in a 
symmetric fashion, the mimetic conception, by establishing an ontology and 
epistemology based on the concepts of originality and autonomy of reason. This 
paradigm can be traced back up to Plato.
In the Book X of the Republic (2003: 317, emphasis added), Plato depicts the 
famous dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon on the theme of true art. In it, 
discussing the role of imitation in painting, he writes: “‘what is the object of painting? 
Does it aim to imitate what is, as it is? Or imitate what appears, as it appears? Is it 
imitation of appearance or of truth?’ ‘Of appearance,’ he said. ‘In that case, I would 
imagine, the art of imitation is a far cry from truth. The reason it can make 
everything, apparently, is that it grasps just a little of each thing – and only an image 
at that”. The dialogue rests on the Platonic doctrine of truth and on the well-known 
separation between the ‘real world’ of the Forms and the ephemeral one of images, 
of their copies or imitations. This is why Socrates can then conclude that “painting – 
and imitation in general – operates in an area of its own, far removed from the truth, 
and that it associates with the element in us which is far removed from intelligence – 
a liaison and friendship from which nothing healthy or true can result.” (Plato, 2003: 
324, emphasis added) 
According to Girard (1987: 8), this understanding of mimesis would have set a 
negative ontology of imitation that has dominated the history of Western thought, so 
preventing the exploration of the relationship between imitation and conflict which, as 
we shall see, is central in the work of the French scholar. This primeval fracture 
between Idea and reality would have resulted in a reductionist vision of imitation, 
limiting it to either mere copying (facial, linguistic, and behavioral) or simple 
representation (imitation of Form or eidos). In effect, even Aristotle (1898: 15), 
although recognizing that “the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from 
childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most 
imitative of living creatures”, seems to denote the concept of mimesis as a mere 
representation of reality. Discussing art, and echoing Plato, he writes in his Poetics 
(1898: 7): “Epic poetry and Tragedy, Comedy also and dithyrambic poetry, and the 
music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general 
conception modes of imitation”. Here, once again, mimesis means re-ad-
4
praesentare, i.e. make present again something by means of the arts. Yet, in 
Aristotle’s work one can find a fundamental difference with Plato’s. The artist, in fact, 
imitating does not simply copy reality but somehow he has the ability to intensify it, to 
make it ‘unique’: “while reproducing the distinctive form of the original” she makes “a 
likeness which is true to life and yet more beautiful.” (Aristotle, 1898: 57) For Aristotle 
(1898: 35), in other words, imitation is not limited to reproduce the real since the fine 
arts, such as poetry, are able to glean and to express the universal. This dialectical 
relationship between imitation and creativity, real and universal, will dominate the 
discourse on imitation from antiquity until the Renaissance (Garrels, 2011: 7).
However, it is worth noting that this conception has effectively relegated the 
relation between imitation and life to the spheres of the arts and of individuality, 
without ever fully apply these insights into the interpersonal, social and political 
domains. Even more important is the fact that imitation has always been conceived 
as sublimation of reality, abstracting representation and not as an actual modality of 
life; reflection on – and pursuit of – stylistic perfection and not analysis of social 
dynamics. In other words, this paradigm of reflection whether understood “as an 
experience, method, or philosophical attitude—desires an order of necessary truths 
immune from semiotic, figural, social, and cultural mediation.” (Sandwell, 1995: 42) 
Based on these assumptions, modern thought has partly built the so-called 
‘Enlightenment project’. The paradigm of reflection is, in fact, only one of the two 
faces of Representationalism. It will find its full development in the modern age, 
when this vision will encounter the new ‘postulate of autonomy’, thus inflicting 
another blow to the mimetic conception of the social world. In this regard, Girard 
(2012: 91-95) believes that Western individualism and the “romantic illusion” of the 
autonomy of humanity has its roots in the Cartesian ego cogito. With its separation 
between perception/emotion and thought/behaviour, it would have promoted “the 
emanation of a serene subjectivity, the creation ex nihilo of a quasi-divine ego.” 
(Girard, 1966: 15) Girard’s critique, in this sense, converges with that of Heidegger 
(2003: 129, emphasis added) who had precisely attributed to Descartes the invention 
of “the idea of the essence of man” by means of which the ‘human being’ “is 
everywhere and at all times determinable and, that means, representable.” The 
construction of this solipsistic subjectivism, and of an intrinsically self-contained 
being that does not need interpersonal relationships to form her own substantia, 
would have transformed the modern individual into the sole source “of the giving-of-
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meaning […] establishing the essence of man as its authoritative subject.” 
(Heidegger, 2003: 129)
It is not difficult then to see why the mimetic dimension has been obscured within 
the Western philosophical discourse. Under the blows of the paradigm of 
representation first, and ‘the myth of autonomy’ later, the idea of “a purely 
autonomous and rational self” was established with the resources “to determine the 
object of his desire without support of other(s) or imitation.” (Garrels, 2011: 8-9) This 
conception has come down to Kant who, in his Critique of Practical Reason (2002: 
48), forcefully states that “Autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws 
and of the duties conforming to them”. However, even if this ‘theorem’ connects 
directly the rational subject with the categorical imperative and the access to morality 
with the autonomy of the individual, Kant is fully aware that freedom and autonomy, 
as pure concepts, represent only the “formal conditions of the possibility of a law.” 
“Therefore the moral law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure 
practical reason, i.e., freedom; and this [autonomy] is itself the formal condition of all 
maxims, under which alone they can harmonize with the supreme practical 
law.”(Kant, 2002: 49, emphasis added) Kant (2002: 49), in short, provides a clear 
separation between formal (or normative) and substantive (non-normative) autonomy 
of the individual, between the foundation of a pure moral law (and the access to it) 
and “any matter of practical rules” which rests “always on subjective conditions” and 
cannot be universal. Unfortunately, this crucial distinction over time has faded, so 
confusing the two levels of analysis. Representation and autonomy, rationality and 
free will, thus went to form that “dialectic of Enlightenment" that has marked the 
history of Western modernity, by ignoring the actual and substantial impact that 
imitation plays in the processes of interpersonal and social formation (O’Shea, 2012: 
3).4 
Mimetic Desire, Acquisitive Mimesis and Rivalry
4 The only partial yet notable exceptions are the works on imitation of Gabriel Tarde (1903) and 
William James (1950).
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As we have tried to show, under the pressure of subjectivist and autonomist 
paradigms imitation has been largely marginalized in the study of social and political 
phenomena. 
Since his first book, Girard (1966: 28-9) has proposed a radical rethinking of the 
individualist ontology, criticizing “the illusion of spontaneous desire and of a 
subjectivity almost divine in its autonomy.” In effect, Girard believes that humans are 
essentially mimetic animals, endowed with an extreme openness to the Other, a 
natural inclination toward interpersonal relationships. This does not mean that 
human beings are a sort of automata at the mercy of social relations but rather that 
they have the peculiar ability to form their own subjectivity only in conjunction with 
others. Autonomy, in other words, would not be achieved by means of a 
‘parthenogenesis of imagination’, as suggested by the Enlightenment and Romantic 
writers, but only through complex mimetic inter-relationships. Here, however, it is 
important to specify the first conceptual originality of mimetic theory. Humans, in fact, 
would not be driven by a tendency to imitation per se, but specifically to imitate the 
desires of others. According to Girard, man is an animal that desires but does not 
know what to desire. For this reason he borrows his desires from others. As Girard 
put it:
Humankind is that creature who lost a part of its animal instinct in order to gain access 
to ‘desire’, as it is called. Once their natural needs are satisfied, humans desire 
intensely, but they don’t know exactly what they desire, for no instinct guides them. We 
do not each have our desire, one really our own. The essence of desire is to have no 
essential goal. Truly to desire we must have recourse to people about us; we have to 
borrow their desires. 
[…] If our desires were not mimetic, they would be forever fixed on predetermined 
objects; they would be a particular form of instinct. Human beings could no more 
change their desire than cows their appetite for grass. Without mimetic desire there 
would be neither freedom nor humanity. (Girard, 2001: 15)
Mimetic desire is, in short, the uniquely human characteristic that distinguishes 
us from other animals. It is the essential factor of social life and yet it is non-
deterministic (because it leaves open the freedom to choose what to imitate) and 
non-instinctual (desire is not an urge, drive, or simply a passion). If it is true then that 
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the human being is a homo desiderans, and that her desires are not an instinct 
satisfiable by itself but require a direction, a model, to be formed, this means that the 
nature of desires is not subjective or objective but always mediated by the Other: 
“[w]e assume that desire is objective or subjective, but in reality it rests on a third 
party who gives value to the objects. The third party is usually the one who is 
closest, the neighbour.” (Girard, 2001: 9) In short, desires are always mediated by a 
model (usually the nearest to us and the most accessible, as in the children-parents 
relationships).
Yet this mediation does not take place in an abstract vacuum but rather in the 
concrete and actual reality. For the form that mimetic desire assumes in the 
mediation is that of an object (a toy, a lover, political power, territory, etc.). This 
makes the relation between desire and imitation problematic because we tend to 
desire the objects desired by our model-mediator, thus creating a potential conflict: 
“If individuals tend to desire what their neighbors possess, or to desire what their 
neighbors even simply desire, this means that rivalry exists at the very heart of 
human relations.” (Girard, 2001: 8) Accordingly, therefore, if desire generates 
imitation and imitation, in turn, evokes desires, this dialectical relation has a 
tendency toward acquisition and appropriation, i.e. to transform imitation in 
competition and rivalry. There is, in fact, a close connection between desire and 
what he calls acquisitive mimesis:
If the appropriative gesture of an individual named A is rooted in the imitation of an 
individual named B, it means that A and B must reach together for one and the same 
object. They become rivals for that object. If the tendency to imitate appropriation is 
present on both sides, imitative rivalry must tend to become reciprocal; it must be 
subject to the back and forth reinforcement that communication theorists call a positive 
feedback. In other words, the individual who first acts as a model will experience an 
increase in his own appropriative urge [i.e. desire] when he finds himself thwarted by 
his imitator and the model of his own model. (Girard, 2003: 9) 
This analysis seems to echo Hobbes’ insights in his Leviathan (1998: 66). It is well-
known that the English philosopher attributes precisely to man’s passions, and to his 
“perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death”, the 
propensity to generate conflict, rivalry and, ultimately, violence.  It is man’s ceaseless 
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desire – combined with his tendency to competition, diffidence and glory – that leads 
him to conflict, so that “if any two men desire the same equality thing, which 
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their 
end, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation 
only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.” (Hobbes, 1998: 83, emphasis 
added) However, there are crucial differences between Girard’s ideas and those of 
the English philosopher. Hobbes’ thought, in fact, rests on a utilitarian perspective 
(scarcity of resources creates conflict) and a negative anthropology (natural 
inclination of man to evil), while Girard (1994: 27; 2004: 10) denies that conflict is 
determined by the scarcity of resources or simply by man’s ‘deviated nature’. For 
Girard, far from being (only) trigged by scarcity or by man’s natural aggressiveness, 
rivalry is the outcome of an imitative process (Girard, 1994: 27).5
To understand the differences between mimetic theory and Hobbes’ 
conceptualizations, it is worth analysing what Girard calls the triangular structure of 
mimetic desire (see figure 1).
{Enter figure 1 about here}
{Enter figure 2 about here}
As we have seen, this ‘structure’ takes the form of a triptych, i.e. it connects the Self, 
the Other as mediator/model and the object that the subject/self desires because she 
believes the mediator desires it. It is important to point out that this “triangle is no 
Gestalt. The real structures are intersubjective. They cannot be localized anywhere; 
the triangle has no reality whatever […] because changes in size and shape do not 
destroy the identity of this figure.” (Girard, 1966: 2, emphasis added) This means 
that the mimetic relations that are established between the subject and the model 
are pre-cognitive and pre-rational, or even if they involve the actors in an active 
manner they are not really conscious and intelligible. Accordingly, the logic driving 
the conflictual escalation between individuals taken in the mimetic rivalry is hidden 
5 With his approach, Girard also distances himself from Hegel and his theory of ‘desire for recognition’ 
(Kojève, 1980: 7). While for Hegel the power of desire rests on wanting to get recognition through the 
desire of others, even at the cost of life, for Girard rivalry rests on the ambivalent desire to possess 
what the Other/model possesses. In Girard, this is not a self-conscious process. On the contrary, it is 
only a subconscious and interpersonal dynamics; indeed a mimetic one.
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from the actors themselves and yet escalating precisely because it cannot be 
completely rationalized:
The appearance of a rival seems to validate the desire, the immense value of the object 
desired. Imitation becomes intensified at the heart of the hostility, but the rivals do all they 
can to conceal from each other and from themselves the cause of the intensification. 
Unfortunately, concealment doesn’t work. In imitating my rival desires I give him the 
impression that he has good reasons to desire what he desires, to possess what he 
possesses, and so the intensity of his desire keeps increasing […] The paradox is that the 
resistance itself brings about the re-enactment. (Girard, 2001: 10, 20)
The origin of the rivalry, then, lies in this double exchange for which the 
individuals involved are part of a double mediation: everyone becomes a model/rival 
of the other increasing mimetic desire and conflict: “[e]ach becomes the imitator of 
his own imitator and the model of his own model. Each tries to push aside the 
obstacle that the other places in his path” (Girard, 2004: 9) (see figure 2). A vicious 
circle is then created by this struggle between doubles which, in some cases, 
transforms the initial rivalry in actual violence. Following Girard, violence is not the 
result of a desire for self-affirmation (as for Hegel) or to possess a not divisible object 
(as in Hobbes), but of the interpersonal and mimetic nature of desire and rivalry that 
tend to escalate to extremes: “violence is generated by this process; or rather 
violence is the process itself when two or more partners try to prevent one another 
from appropriating the object they all desire through physical or other means”. 
(Girard, 2004: 9, emphasis added) In short, there would be no first cause – an archè 
of violence – through which to trace back the origins of hostility since violence is 
generated and not original. The reciprocity of mimetic rivalry is the nucleus of 
conflict. It is precisely for this reason that it has a tendency to intensify because 
desire, as it were, “is responsible for its own evolution.” (Girard, 1987: 304) 
This would also explain the tendency of violence to escalate in size and 
numbers, that is toward what Girard (2001: 22) defines snowballing or violent 
contagion. Once spread in a group or community, thanks to the mimetic nature of 
rivalry, violence may become contagious, triggering a kind of chain reactions through 
which this mimetic interplay transforms antagonists into a “mass of interchangeable 
beings. In this homogeneous mass the mimetic impulses no longer encounter any 
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obstacle and spread at high speed”. (Girard, 2001: 22) The logic of revenge and 
vendetta closely resemble this violent reciprocal interaction. However, if violence is 
characterized by this tendency to escalate (among individuals as well as groups and 
political community), how is it possible to establish peaceful forms of coexistence? 
And what is the role of institutions and culture in determining conflict as well as 
pacification? Is it possible to interpose something to the mimetic contagion that, as 
we have seen, represents the central problem of rivalry? To answer these questions 
it is necessary to explore the second part of Girard’s theoretical apparatus.          
Violence, Culture and Religion: The Missing Link
Mimetic theory is not only an attempt to conceptualize the role of violence in human 
relations, but also – and above all – an approach capable of linking violence with the 
origin of culture, its symbolic forms, and religion.
Following Girard, we have seen that the possibility of escalation is inherent in 
violence and rivalry, precisely because of their mimetic character. This tendency to 
extremes is the result of a profoundly human characteristic, i.e. mimetic desire. 
Accordingly, this means that the propensity to violent escalation is a specifically 
human feature because it rests on his peculiar mimicry of desires. But is it really so? 
Numerous ethological researches seem to corroborate this view (Palaver, 2013: 122-
4; de Waal, 1996: 71-73). Even in the animal kingdom in general, and among the 
anthropomorphic monkeys in particular, imitation and competition play an important 
role in triggering conflict but with one major difference: “human beings enter into 
rivalry for highly symbolized objects and that the very existence of these rivalries is 
made possible by symbolic institutions.” (Girard, 1987: 93) In other words, while in 
the animal kingdom violence and conflict are held in check by dominance patterns, 
i.e. well-defined pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic hierarchical systems, humans have 
the unique ability to create symbolic institutions to canalize “desire in divergent 
directions and making acquisitive mimesis impossible.” (Girard, 1987: 91) 
In order to explain this difference, which is crucial, Girard does not postulate an 
ontological difference between humans and animals but, from an evolutionary 
perspective, he retraces the genealogy of imitation to establish a point of 
differentiation. Through this ‘archaeology of man’, captured in its transition from the 
animal kingdom, Girard believes that it was precisely the increased propensity for 
imitation to have triggered the process of hominization. There must have been a time 
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when “the intensification of mimetic rivalry, which is already very much in evidence at 
the level of primates, destroyed dominance patterns and gave rise to progressively 
more elaborated and humanised forms of culture.” (Girard, 1987: 94) This 
phylogenetic moment is defined by Girard the founding murder. At a time when 
mimetic rivalry reaches a high level of intensity, it would trigger a mimetic crisis, a 
chain reaction of violence, much like the war of all against all described by Hobbes. It 
would be at that point that the crowd – experiencing an undifferentiated violence, 
once that all the ‘natural’ mechanisms which used to contain violence are broken – in 
the choice between the mutual and complete self-destruction and survival, would 
canalize violence towards a surrogate victim or scapegoat: “The community affirms 
its unity in the sacrifice, a unity that emerges from the moment when division is most 
intense, when the community enacts its dissolution in the mimetic crisis and its 
abandonment to the endless cycle of vengeance. But suddenly the opposition of 
everyone against everyone else is replaced by the opposition of all against one.” 
(Girard, 1987: 24) This scapegoat mechanism would create, for the very first time, a 
symbolic signifier through which the new community, becoming aware of the 
difference between a before and an after, an inside and an outside, peace and 
violence, would create a protoform culture. This primeval symbolic differentiation 
would rest right on the mechanism of scapegoating. For, the surrogate victim is 
sacrificed because she is considered responsible for the disorder and, at the same 
time, her killing restores an order of meaning. She would be, then, the subject of a 
double transference: she would literally be sacrificed, which means killed and made 
sacred, an object of contempt (as cause of the disorder) as well as veneration (for 
the re-establishment of order). This dual nature of the sacred would explain the 
contradictory meaning of this term that has been recorded by many anthropologists 
and by Durkheim (2008: 306) who has described the “ambiguous nature”, the 
tendency to “transmute” – to stand in the balance between purity and impurity – of 
this concept. Culture and religion, then, would be born out of murder. For this 
reason, Girard (2010: 21), from his anthropological perspective, states that original 
sin is vengeance – “never-ending vengeance” - because only this process could 
trigger the cycle of violence that has led to the first mimetic crisis and, therefore, to 
the actualization of the scapegoat mechanism.
This hypothesis on the origin of culture, and on the relation between violence 
and religion, is somewhat controversial because of its meta-historical character. The 
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founding murder is in fact an episode (or series of incidents or crises) that happened 
in illo tempore, and cannot be empirically analysed. Yet, according to Girard, there 
would be traces and significant evidence of this historical moment. The founding 
murder would constitute a sort of anthropogenic Big Bang and, just like the 
primordial explosion, it would have left traces and cultural remnants in myths, rituals 
and prohibitions. In one of his best known book, Violence and the Sacred (1977), 
Girard explores in depth the structure of myths, especially the myths of origin, to 
reveal how they “always begin by recounting a crisis in human relations, which often 
takes the guise of an ‘affliction’ or ‘plague’.” (Antonello, 2010: 24). Usually, in the 
mythical narrative, these are resolved “through a dramatic alteration in the mimetic 
unanimity:  the violence of the community… all devolves into a single victim… 
chosen for arbitrary reasons.” In other words, the structure of myths would replicate 
that of the sacred, “the foundational act of which is the lynching or the expulsion, real 
at first, and later symbolic, of an innocent victim.” (Antonello, 2010: 24, emphasis 
added) But there is more. Through this archaeology of the arcane, Girard (1987: 21) 
is able to show how “all prohibitions and rituals can be related to mimetic conflict.” 
For prohibitions in archaic societies would have the aim to prevent the potentially 
conflictual imitation (think of the Decalogue: Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not 
commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, etc.), while rituals 
“should be an attempt to reproduce, often in frighteningly realistic manner, precisely 
what societies fear the most”, i.e. violent escalation. In short, rituals would have a 
cathartic purpose (to symbolically re-enact sacrifices to avoid violent escalation) 
while prohibitions a preventive one (to forbid violent acts and conflictual behaviour). 
In this way it is possible to understand why for Girard there is an indissoluble link 
between violence and (archaic) religion, not because they contain a violent 
ideologeme (as is often assumed) but because, born out of primordial violence, they 
are always exposed to the ‘marks of the sacred’, its structure, prohibitions and 
purifying rituals. For this reason, Girard (1987: 32) can finally state that: “Religion is 
nothing other than this immense effort to keep the peace. The sacred is violence, but 
if religious man worships violence it is only insofar as the worship of violence is 
supposed to bring peace; religion is entirely concerned with peace, but the means it 
has of bringing it about are never free of sacrificial violence.” 
The Event of Crucifixion: History, Secularization and Eschatology
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Girard has devoted the last phase of his career to biblical exegesis and to the study 
of the differences between archaic religions and those of the Book, so elaborating 
what is considered the most controversial aspect of his analysis. Drawing on an 
unpublished work of Nietzsche, defined by Girard the “single greatest theological text 
of the nineteenth century” (Palaver 2013: 197), he has discovered that there is a 
radical antithesis between archaic religions and Christianity. In fact, both the mythical 
and the Biblical narratives present a strong ‘sacrificial structure’, that is accounts of 
violence and sacrifices. Yet, according to Girard, while the mythic narrative 
‘conceals’ the sacrificial mechanism in its account, which is always told from the 
perspective of the perpetrators, Christianity would have reversed this narrative, 
putting the victim at the centre of the discourse on violence. The analogy between 
ancient religions and Christianity (which had been extensively studied by James G. 
Frazer), then, would only be structural, not substantive. With Christianity, what the 
myth tells in the form of a purgatory and expiatory self-justification (sacrifice as 
necessary), is brought to the consciousness of its uselessness and injustice. As 
Girard put it:
In myth, the standpoint is always that of the violent community that discharges its violence 
onto a victim it sees as guilty and whom it expels as a means of reestablishment the social 
order. In the mythic account the victim is always guilty, and is represented as such. Think of 
Oedipus, who commits parricide and incest and for that is expelled from the city […] 
Christianity reverses this situation, demonstrating that the victim is not guilty and that the 
unanimous crowd knows not what it does when it unjustly accuses this victim. […] With the 
gospel and the Passion of Jesus, this anthropological truth about humanity is revealed, put 
on display in its entirety: we, in our history as cultural animals, have always sought 
scapegoats in order to resolve our crisis, and we have killed and then divinized them without 
knowing what we were doing. (Antonello, 2010: 24-26)
The crucifixion, then, would represent the Event-advent of modernity. It is only 
thanks to the unveiling of the mimetic mechanism brought about by the Christian 
message that humanity could escape the ‘sacrificial loop’, so starting a progressive 
and non-cyclic historical path (i.e., not linked to the sacrificial cycle). Modernity, 
therefore, should be understood, literally as overcoming of a modus, a limit, i.e. the 
scapegoat mechanism. This new awareness, for Girard, would act as a destructive 
principle that brings with itself both the emergence of a new ethic and, at the same 
time, the seeds of its own (self)dissolution. This means that the Christian ethic, with 
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its emphasis on freedom and free will, would lead to a process of demystification and 
desacralization because “secularization also entails the end of the sacrificial.” There 
is, in fact, “a temporality of the sacrificial, and violence is subject to erosion and 
entropy […] When, thanks to Christianity, we get rid of the sacred, there is a salvific 
opening up to agape, to charity, but there is also an opening up to perhaps greater 
violence.” (Antonello, 2010: 32) Here Girard’s analysis crosses once again that of 
some of the great thinkers of the twentieth century. His idea of modernity as 
liberation and secularization, both triggered by the Christian message, echoes the 
analysis of Charles Taylor and Ivan Illich. The latter had precisely defined modernity 
as a corruptio optimi pessima, i.e. as a secularization of the Christian message 
deprived of its transcendent force. In the reading given by Taylor (in Illich, 2005: xi): 
The secularization of Western culture and, indeed, widespread disbelief in God have arisen 
in close symbiosis with this belief in a moral order of rights-bearing individuals who are 
destined (by God or Nature) to act for mutual benefit. Such an order thus rejects the earlier 
honour ethic which exalted the warrior, just as the new order also tends to occlude any 
transcendent horizon […] This understanding of order has profoundly shaped the modern 
West’s dominant forms of imaginary: the market economy, the public sphere, the sovereign 
‘people.’   
The theological structure of Christianity would have been eroded from within, 
immanentized, emptied of its original ethical message (i.e., the persona replaced 
with the individual, the Christian ethos with fragmented ethics, the imitatio Christi 
with the models imposed by the new society of the spectacle, authority with the mere 
legality, etc.). In this way, one can understand why, according to Girard, the 
contemporary age of globalization rests, literally, on an apocalyptic trend 
(understood as unveiling and revealing). The release produced by Christianity has 
left us without ‘safeguards’ of the sacred, liberating us but, at the same time, 
unleashing a potential unlimited mimetic conflict. In the contemporary age, where all 
distinctions, barriers and classic mediations seem to weaken and collapse, there is 
room for a planetary crisis of undifferentiation. If, on the one hand, globalization has 
created a huge potential for interpersonal relations and exchange, on the other hand 
it has left open an abysmal ethical gap, failing to develop an ethical model 
appropriate to its age of extreme mobility. In a world that rests on neo-liberal 
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postulates, on the logic of the market and the models imposed by it, and in which the 
power of the new technology is not capable of producing new ethical principles, “the 
whole planet now finds itself, with regard to violence, in a situation comparable to 
that of the most primitive groups of human beings, except that this time we are fully 
aware of it.” (Girard, 1987: 260-1) In this final stage, Girard’s analysis, crossing that 
of some reactionary thinkers such as Schmitt and Heidegger, sends us a message of 
ambiguous pessimism: the problem of man in the age of the world picture cannot 
simply be solved by idolatrizing or demonizing technology but rather trying to 
develop a thought capable of thinking its problematicity, an ethics adequate to the 
new mobile condition of the homo technologicus.   
Mimetic Theory and the ‘International’: Implications, Issues and Themes
What are the implications of Girard’s insights for international studies? What is the 
picture of the ‘international’ that opens before us when we approach the world from 
the vantage point of mimesis? Building on the first half of the paper, this section 
outlines the analytical opportunities and substantive challenges that arise from 
rethinking the subject and theoretical field of international studies mimetically. The 
argument put forward here is that Girard’s insights into the political, the role of 
violence and the place of the sacred provide a set of promising and powerful starting 
points for theorising ‘the international’ that are alternative to the International 
Relations (IR) canon. Firstly, they have the potential to radically destabilize the 
understandings put forward by classic and contemporary theories of IR, starting from 
the long-dominant realist tradition and its liberal alter-ego, concerning key 
foundational notions such as international order and anarchy. Secondly, they raise 
important questions and point to some critical inadequacies in how we theorise the 
social, sacred and global plane on which the edifice of international politics is 
purportedly built. Thirdly and lastly, they are able to read the central problematique of 
international relations – the problem of war and, by extension, security – through 
markedly different analytical lenses. In the process of engaging with mimetic theory, 
international studies emerges as a new subject, freed from the conventional 
hierarchies in which IR theory has confined it, yet also pointedly different from the 
picture painted by other critical accounts of IR and ultimately, genuinely and 
organically linked to the broader field of human and social experience. 
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That no engagement with the writings of René Girard has yet taken place in 
IR, with only a few notable exceptions (Thomas, 2005; Juergensmeyer 1991, 2008; 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2013), is a testament to the oft-lamented 
intellectual narrowness of the field. It would be tempting at this stage to fill this 
notable gap by doing what IR has accustomed itself with (Brown, 2013) – namely, 
appropriating a new thinker, normalise his work for an IR audience, and announce 
the start of the ‘mimetic turn’ in IR. The aim of this Special Issue and of this 
introduction, however, is different. The attempt here is not to muster up a new 
orthodoxy. Rather, it is to paint and contemplate the new picture of the ‘international’ 
that emerges once a change of perspective is introduced – a perspective that unveils 
a powerfully different point of origin and projects us towards an unsettling vanishing 
point.
Of origins, ontology and teleology: mimetic challenges to IR theory
Despite the strong assonance in themes, Girard’s writings have not directly engaged 
with the subject matter of international relations, as academically defined, let alone 
with its theories. Bringing mimetic theory to bear on IR Theory is therefore an 
invigorating yet not entirely straightforward exercise, given the frequent slippage in 
conceptual categories, vocabulary and quite naturally methods. However, it is 
precisely in this slippage, tension and sudden reversals of perspective that one finds 
precious material for reflection. 
The first and most fundamental of such reversals concerns the relation 
between politics, order and violence. The primacy of politics is the first IR canon that 
gets dispelled in light of Girard’s insights into the origins of the political – a set of 
insights that Benoît Chantre effectively summarised in the formula, ‘politics is part of 
violence, not violence part of politics’ (Girard 2012: 109). In Girard, violence is not 
the recessive, weak element in the binary relation with politics, but the dominant, 
prevailing one. Violence is the scarlet secret presiding over the construction of 
political order and, as such, it is violence that has a primacy over politics, not the 
other way around. This clearly poses a challenge first and foremost to those liberal 
approaches to international relations (eg., Ikenberry 2011; Slaughter 2005) whose 
formal understanding of order remains optimistically blind to power imbalances, 
patterns of colonial and neo-colonial domination as well the sheer human costs of 
maintaining the international system and its power structure. In Girardian terms, 
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liberalism fails to acknowledge the permanently violent, necessarily sacrificial basis 
of political order.
Throughout his writings, Girard stigmatises and critiques harshly that 
Enlightenment rationalism which still propels contemporary liberal approaches to IR 
by, on the one hand, debunking the illusion of an authentic, autonomous and rational 
‘self’ (on which see above and more later) and by ridiculing the acritical attachment 
to Reason that the liberal project subscribes to – be it in the pursuit of its human 
rights agenda or in its democratic, cosmopolitan ambitions (cfr. Zolo 2002). 
Laconically, Girard invites us to let go of this rationalist use of reason as one lets go 
of one last mythology, sure that one day we will look back and sigh, ‘we “believed” in 
reason, as people believed in the gods’ (Girard 2012: 119).
In their rejection of liberalism’s key assumptions, Girard’s mimetic insights 
show a profound assonance with two other contemporary theoretical trajectories in 
IR, that of realism and critical theory, albeit with key differences in outlook vis-à-vis 
both. Starting from realism, there is no doubt that realism and mimetic theory 
converge in foregrounding a number of elements: firstly, the idea that violence, or the 
threat thereof, defines the human and political condition; secondly, the notion that 
fear and competition are powerful and endemic forces that need restraining so as to 
preserve a modicum of order; thirdly, the acknowledgement that any order is the 
result of a specific economy of power and violence (Williams 2005, Mearsheimer 
2001, Lebow 2003). Mimetic theory, however, digs deeper into this state of affairs 
and, by doing so, demonstrates the hollowness of those second order categories 
which realism takes as theoretical building blocks. Two cases in points are the 
category of ‘human nature’ for classical realism (Morgenthau 1978; cfr. Troy, in this 
Issue) and anarchy for structural realism (Waltz 1959, 1979).
In terms of the former, mimetic theory does not fall into trap of reifying human 
nature as evil and/or power-obsessed in order to explain conflict. A detailed above 
with regards to Hobbes, there is no place, and in fact no need for any such 
anthropological assumptions in Girard’s account of how conflict happens. Violence 
and war are inherently relational rather than unit-based occurrences, engendered as 
they are by the convergence of desires over objects or beings, i.e., acquisitive 
mimesis, rather than any innate and subjective proclivity towards conflict. 
Interestingly, this may lead one to conclude that in its emphasis on ‘system effects’ 
(Jervis 1997), strategic interaction and third-image patterns, neorealism may be 
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closer to a mimetic understanding of international politics. With anarchy pointing to a 
mere negative condition, i.e., the absence of overarching authoritative mechanisms 
to prevent conflict, it is Hobbesian scarcity and competition over finite, scarce goods 
– power, territory, security – that function as trigger for war in neorealism. Mimetic 
theory, however, strips scarcity of its explanatory power and exposes anarchy as an 
empty container when it demonstrates that conflict arises irrespective of the nature of 
the object around which desires and interests positively converge – rivalry is what 
determines scarcity, not the other way around (on scarcity, see Dumouchel 2014). 
Ultimately, this also reveals another aspect over which neorealism and mimetic 
theory are bound to diverge – while the former remains materialist and object-
centred in its obsession with capabilities and quantifiers of power, the latter adopts 
an inter-subjective, ‘we-centric’ (Anspach 2011: 130), and entirely processual 
approach (Dupuy 2011: 209). In this approach, objects of contention not only 
dramatically lose importance over the power of rivalry itself, but they also reveal their 
ultimately symbolic, rather than substantive, essence (Farneti 2009).
It is precisely in its emphasis of the radically interpersonal nature of the 
human and political condition, particularly in the prominent role that the ‘Other’ plays 
in mediating our desires (Oughourlian 2007), that mimetic theory shows overlaps 
with another set of approaches to IR, those inspired by critical theory (since Cox 
1983 and in the sense employed by, e.g., Booth 2007). The relentless suspicion of 
Western rationality provides the first commonality. The idea that human and political 
desires, identities and interests emerge in an intersubjective nexus, rather than 
exclusively by the Cartesian will of rational actors, forms another point of contact. 
Finally, there is a clear critical ethos to the concern that mimetic theory has for 
scapegoats, victims and outcasts, understood to be embodied emblems of the 
violence inscribed in political order, be it domestic or international. On all these 
issues there is a clear potential for a fruitful encounter between strands of critical IR 
theories and mimetic theory.
Mimetic theory, however, part ways with critical theory when it comes to the 
diagnosis of the contemporary condition, as well as its prognosis (McKenna 1992, 
2011). Both would point to the erosion of institutions such as sovereignty and war 
and the correspondent, limitless expansion of violence as one of the fundamental 
traits of our globalised existence. However, they would differ markedly in terms of 
whether and how a possible path to resolution can be found. Where critical theory 
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employs the method of relentless critique and deconstruction to navigate the 
complexity the late modern condition, mimetic theory becomes decidedly metaphysic 
and eschatological when it invokes the possibility of grace and redemption via the 
path of imitatio Christi. The narrative that Girard weaves through history is clearly 
incompatible with the incredulity towards foundations professed by theorists of a 
critical bent. It is all the more intriguing to then observe the cases of those who have 
abandoned the former camp and leapt into the revelation of the latter (on Vattimo, 
see Antonello 2010 and Depoortere 2008).
By contrasting mimetic theory with contemporary IR theories one can 
appreciate the uniqueness of Girard’s approach. Borrowing from the IR vocabulary 
and by way of preliminary conclusion, one could summarise the status of a mimetic 
approach to IR as follows: a parsimonious, critical yet foundational, anti-rationalist 
and intersubjective account to international politics that starts from the study of 
violence and ends with an eschatology of salvation.
Beyond the Sacred, Before the Social: Global Politics and Mimesis
Mimetic theory shows unique theoretical characteristics when compared to 
contemporary theories of IR. Girard’s insights, however, are also precious in 
illuminating three substantive yet often contested issues in IR: the social, sacred and 
global aspect of international politics.
Mimetic theory provides an account of the social mechanisms underlying the 
human and political condition which is much richer and deeper than that provided by 
mainstream IR accounts. Admittedly, for a field often identifying itself as social 
science, IR has done remarkably well considering that for a very long time it lacked 
ways of conceptualising the social. Progress has been made since the opening up of 
the field to sociological approaches (Lawson 2007), including social constructivism 
(Onuf 1990, Wendt 1999). With its focus on the intersubjective mechanisms that 
generate human and political outcomes, however, mimetic theory provides a view of 
the social which is able to channel, contextualise and ultimately go beyond the 
insights advanced by social constructivism. There is no doubt that, in Girard’s 
account, the most crucial process responsible for the creation and maintenance of 
political order, i.e., scapegoating, is a social and intersubjective one. In fact, once 
could argue that scapegoating is a classic example of a process of social 
construction – an intersubjective, violent meaning-making endeavour. As detailed 
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above, violence in Girard is ‘neither with the object, nor with the subject, but amongst 
the subjects’, to paraphrase scholars of the Copenhagen school (Buzan, Waever, de 
Wilde 1998: 31), i.e., it cannot be explained by the object over which it is fought, nor 
through individual proclivities, but rather through a process of intersubjective, social 
construction. Conversely, however, one could argue that the reason why threats can 
be socially constructed and processes of securitization are so powerful is that they 
conform to, indeed they are instances of, the sacrificial dynamic which for Girard is 
responsible for the very making of signifiers and the construction of society in the 
first place. ‘Social construction’ therefore becomes a species of which mimesis is the 
genus.
Girard’s conceptualisation of the ‘sacred’ is also of unique value, considering 
the state contemporary debates between secularism and religion in IR, i.e., between 
the so-called ‘resurgence of the sacred’ and the secular Westphalian model (for a 
critical review, see Petito and Hatzopoulos, 2003; Review of International Studies, 
2012). While certainly advancing our understanding of the relationship between 
religion, violence and ‘the international’, these debates have essentially ended up 
mirroring the dichotomy between secularism and anti-secularism, or secular and 
post-secular (Habermas, 2008). As such, they have ended up reinforcing the 
apparent irreconcilability of these two fundamental dimensions of international 
politics and have remained imprisoned in yet another conceptual aporia, in what 
Scott Appleby has defined the ‘ambiguity of the sacred’ (Appleby 2000). Girard cuts 
through this ambiguity and debunks the false dichotomy between the ‘religious’ and 
the ‘secular’ by offering an account of human history where sacred violence and 
political, ‘secular’ order are intimately linked rather than dichotomous.
Thirdly, mimetic theory also provides a reading of the global condition which 
jars with the more benign account of globalisation and offers an alternative narrative 
of its contradictions. According to Girard, globalisation marks the highest stage of 
political modernity as well as the beginning of its undoing (Cowdell 2013; see also 
Cerella, in this Issue). If violence stems from the confluence rather than divergence 
of desires, the identity and homogeneity engendered by globalisation introduces a 
playing field in which competition, rather than cooperation, becomes the norm. Here 
too, mimetic theory reveals the problematic assumptions upon which the liberal 
paradigm is built. A case in point is the ‘soft power’ approach (Nye 2004). The idea 
that making people ‘want what you want’ is necessarily a prelude to cooperation and 
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peace is valid only if one ignores the conflictual potential of mimesis. Girard’s 
insights, therefore, provide a welcome and corrective tonic to the hubristic claims of 
hyperglobalists and liberal optimists. In fact, when Girard considers the age of 
globalisation as being hysterically mimetic (Girard 2001), this is by no means to 
celebrate the triumph of Western liberal democracy over the globe, but to underscore 
the limitless potential for violence and conflict which is disclosed in the process.
Mimesis, Political Violence and International Security
The problem of violence, conflict and war may still be considered the central 
research question of IR and yet its study has been stunted by a set of unhelpful 
conceptual dichotomies and unnatural disciplinary divisions. Scholars of mainstream 
IR have notoriously studied war in isolation from the broader problem-field of political 
violence (Burgess 2010); scholars of political violence, on the other hand, approach 
war only insofar as this fits under the broader umbrella of ‘conflict’ (Kalyvas 2006). 
Engaging with Girard’s work is particularly helpful in doing away with these 
disciplinary and analytical reifications and regain a sense of both the fluidity and the 
centrality of the problem of violence. This is particularly helpful at a time when our 
conceptual categories – from war to terrorism – are undergoing a process of erosion, 
with boundaries blurring under the effect of the powerful historical social forces of 
late modernity.
To start with, as seen above in more detail, Girard identifies in the sacrificial 
violence of scapegoating the mechanism central to the construction and the 
maintenance of order, a process able to channel the violence of all against all into 
the violence of all against one. If one looks at the history of the XX century as well as 
contemporary international affairs, the relevance of such mechanism cannot be 
overestimated. Scapegoating provides a powerful explanatory key to account for 
violence exercised both on a mass scale and on a micro scale: from genocides 
recurring across continents and cultures to the lynching of ethnic minority individuals 
on the streets of Western democracies (Dumouchel 2009, 2011). When directed 
towards foreign ‘enemies’, scapegoating becomes a type of foreign policy that can 
sustain governments in crisis through the contagious escalation of displaced 
violence – diversionary theories of war (at least since Levy 1989) seem to be clearly 
mimetic in essence. Aside from its multifarious applications, scapegoating provides 
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us with a powerful reminder concerning the mobility of violence. This may contrast 
quite starkly with the inability of our IR analytical categories to travel, but this 
however only underlines the value of a mimetic theory able to embrace all of these 
forms.
It is also worth noting how the very principle of imitation or mimesis at the 
heart of Girard’s writings remain understudied in international politics. Yet, its 
potential applications are virtually infinite, especially at a time when society, 
economy and culture exhibit such a high degree of homogenisation through mimesis 
– from the proliferation of ‘memes’ (Dawkins, 1976), to the apparent mimicry of 
political parties, to the rise of an undifferentiated ‘global culture’. More specifically to 
international politics and security, the simple observation that desires, interests and 
identity are imitated, rather than spontaneous, resonates with and further illuminates 
a variety of patterns: from Cold war and post-Cold war bipolarity read as reciprocity 
(Sakwa 2013; Farneti 2013) to strategic interaction ‘tit-for-tat’ game-theoretical 
models; from radicalisation understood as imitation to leader-follower relations within 
terrorist organisations as mimetic model-subject relations (cfr. Brighi, in this Issue). 
Scholars have just started to explore and move beyond these possibilities (Polat 
2012), yet much work still lies ahead.
Lastly, mimetic theory offers a convincing reading of both the function of war 
as well as its erosion as institution of international society that IR scholars are ill-
advised to ignore. The observation that war, just like a foundational murder, is the 
constitutive act of international order might resonate with early intuitions of scholars 
belonging to the English school of international relations (Bonanate 1995: 56) but it is 
certainly given additional depth and gravitas when read in the context of Girard’s 
historical narrative of violence. Girard’s reading of the contemporary practice and 
status of war is also worth engaging with from an IR perspective. In terms of the new 
practises of war, the use of private military companies is a case in point. As Girard 
fittingly reminds us when discussing the figure of the servant in Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar and of Fedka the beggar in Fedor Dostoevsky’s novel Devils, in order for 
sacrifice to be effective, societies often need actors able to ‘perform the sacrifice on 
the sacrificers’ behalf’ (Girard 1991: 217) thus shifting the blame to some 
‘expendable third party’ who will have to carry the stigma of murder (cfr. Baggiarini, 
in this issue). As for the status of war, Girard provides an arresting account of the 
decline of war, understood as modern institution, and the coming of a permanent 
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state of limitless violence. The value of this account does not simply lie in the fact 
that it is in line with the contemporary empirical reality of war. Girard’s reading of 
contemporary war is set into, and put in relation with, a sweeping and masterful 
narrative of the history our civilisation the kind of which IR has quite possibly never 
produced and which now can no longer afford to ignore.
Plan of the Issue
This special issue consists of three core sections. In the first section, mimetic theory 
is presented and assessed in the context of the contemporary theoretical trajectories 
within IR and, secondly, compared to the arguably still central theoretical approach 
of political Realism. The first paper is by Jodok Troy, who interrogates Girard’s 
thought through the lens of Hans Morgenthau’s political realism. Troy starts by noting 
a number of striking parallels between Morgenthau and Girard, especially in their 
treatment of notions such as power and desire. He moves on to argue that the 
anthropological insights of Girard can enrich the general thinking about the Self, 
Other and identity in the 20th century Realist tradition. Ultimately, Girard’s thought 
helps shedding light on a number of implicit claims and assumptions regarding 
violence and human nature that remain central to political Realism. In the second 
paper of the section, Antonio Cerella compares Carl Schmitt’s and Girard’s 
theoretical proposals about the origins, containment and diffusion of violence in order 
to explore the end of the Nomos and of its sacrality. This exploration serves to trace 
an alternative genealogy of world politics, from its tragic beginnings up to the 
dissolution of the political form in the so-called ‘global age’. Against the backdrop of 
classical political theory – from Hobbes to Rousseau and Clausewitz – Girard’s and 
Schmitt’s radical, and radically different, understandings of the role of violence in the 
‘political’ shed light on the problem of political order in the Post-Westphalian age.
In the second section of the issue, Girard’s mimetic theory will be used to 
rethink the thorny relationship between religion and violence in international 
relations, to explore the conundrum of the ambiguity of the sacred, and to propose a 
different ‘image’ of the nature of political conflict at the international level, as well as 
of the means for its resolution. Scott Thomas’ contribution takes issue with the 
current state of affairs and sets out a challenging alternative approach to the study of 
war in international relations as well as the relationship between religion and 
violence. Thomas contends that the problem of ‘religious violence’ has been 
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invented or constructed as one of the main issues in the ‘religious turn’ in IR, or the 
global resurgence of religion. His paper seeks to link mimetic theory with specific 
approaches to international theory – it points towards critical theory, post-positivism, 
and continental approaches to social constructivism in IR – in order to overcome the 
use of substantive definitions of religion in political science and international relations 
and move towards a functional and a more expansive understanding of it. While 
Rosemary Durward agrees with Scott Thomas’ deconstruction of the notion of 
religious violence, she also focuses on the potentiality of emancipation inherent in 
mimetic theory. In particular, taking a cue from Girard’s latest ‘apocalyptic’ phase, 
where he asserts that ‘politics cannot save us’, she suggests a new reading of 
Girard’s latest writings as an injunction to expand our definition of global politics and 
its possibilities, starting from a revision of just war theory and an exploration of an 
‘ontology of charity’. Lastly, according to Harald Wydra, we should rethink and re-
frame the so-called ‘religious resurgence’ in global politics. The binding power of the 
sacred, according to Wydra, occurs in liminal borderline experiences of crisis, revolt, 
or terror – when regularities, hierarchies, conventional limits of ‘normal’ politics, and 
markers of certainty break down. Forms of collective self-transcendence emerge in 
unexpected and inexplicable moments of authority vacuum and re-aggregation 
brought about by the process of global mobilization. The sacrificial crisis which 
Girard points out as defining the contemporary condition thus intersects with the 
proliferation of victimhood in which, however, sacrifice no longer saves and 
manifests itself in trends such as the contemporary quest for certainty and the 
appeal to a sacred future.
The third and final section of the Special Issue will offer insights from mimetic 
theory into some of the most crucial and debated contemporary political issues: from 
the military privatization of violence in USA to the biopolitics of security, from the 
emergence of new forms of political violence and terrorism to the persistence of 
sacrifice. The section begins with a contribution by Margaret Denike who invites us 
to reconsider René Girard’s general account of sacrificial violence in order to 
elucidate the race-thinking that structures contemporary discourses on security in 
Western security states, particularly in Canada and the USA. In doing so, she 
explains how sacrificial violence is a productive tool for critically elucidating the 
affective politics of security discourses, including those that organize and inform the 
biopolitical formations of race distinctions. From a different perspective, Bianca 
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Baggiarini focuses on the growing military privatization to launch a challenge to 
Girard’s mimetic theory. Using Foucault’s conceptual tools, she explores how military 
privatization permits states to (silently and precariously) call for a sort of ‘end of 
sacrifice’. This concealment of violence is then linked to the genealogical trajectories 
of the citizen-soldier to argue that military privatization, as exemplified by the 
burgeoning industry of private military and security companies (PMSCs) and the 
current American administration’s use of drone warfare, allows for the removal of 
sacrifice as a feature of the post-WWII social contract between states and citizens. 
Finally, the extent to which violence and sacrality shape contemporary terrorism is 
explored by Elisabetta Brighi. Using the examples of Anders Breivik’s massacre in 
Oslo, the ‘marathon bombers’ in Boston and the Woolwich attack in London, she 
focuses on the new phenomenon of lone-wolf terrorism and contends that notions of 
‘imitation’, ‘sacrifice’ and ‘desire’ are central categories to conceptualize this form of 
terrorism and simultaneously reclaim it as a form of political, rather mindless, 
violence.
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  Figure 1. Girard’s Mimetic Model
MODEL
Figure 2. Inter-subjective dynamics: the dynamics converges towards an attractor that is 
generated by itself. The evolution is said to be reflexive, self-enforcing and path-dependent.
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